NOTES
IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER
THE UNITED STATES HOUSING
ACT OF 1937
In the United States Housing Act of 1937 (USHA), 1 Congress enacted sweeping legislation designed to correct one of the fundamental
socio-economic ills of the Great Depression: "the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of lower income."' 2 The
"shortage" persisted in the postwar era, and the USHA program today
remains a central institutional feature of the federal public housing
machinery.
The program's main function is to subsidize the operation of local
public housing authorities. 3 The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and a local housing authority enter into an Annual

Contributions Contract, under which HUD guarantees the payment of
specified subsidies and the local agency pledges satisfaction of multiple
departmental conditions of subsidization. 4 Local housing authorities can
qualify for federal assistance only by complying with the provisions of
federal housing law and HUD regnlations, 5 including, for example, the

limitations on the rent that may be charged to tenants 6 and the extensive
requirements for the inclusion of specific protective provisions in leases
7
between housing authorities and tenants.
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1437-1437r (West 1978 & Supp. 1987).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982). The broad policy goals of the USHA are set out as follows:
It is the policy of the United States to promote the general welfare of the Nation by employing its funds and credit... to assist the several States and their political subdivisions to
remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent,
safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of lower income and ... to vest in local public
housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the administration of their
housing programs.
Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437, 1437c(a) (1982).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437c-1437d (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
5. See, e.g., Beckham v. New York City Hous. Auth., 755 F.2d 1074, 1075-76 (2d Cir. 1985)
("[S]ubsidies are conditioned on annual verification ... of each public housing tenant and the Authority's compliance with [bothl the federal Housing Act and the regulations governing the federally-funded public housing program.").
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (the "Brooke Amendment").
7. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (1987).
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In recent years, tenants of federally subsidized public housing have
begun to seek redress of their grievances against local housing authorities
or HUD by bringing private actions in federal courts based on various
provisions of the USHA or related HUD regulations. Because the
USHA does not itself expressly provide for a private right of action to
enforce its provisions, these cases present a threshold question: Is there
an implied private right of action under the United States Housing Act of
1937?8
This note begins with an overview of the development and current
status of implied right of action doctrine. 9 It then turns to a survey of
the lower federal courts' conflicting and often confused analysis of the
USHA implied right of action issue.10 The note then seeks to clarify the
issue through an analysis of the USHA under the Supreme Court's Cort
v. Ash 11 approach to implied right of action questions. 12 The note concludes that, despite the Supreme Court's recent reluctance to imply a
private right of action where Congress has not directly provided for one,
the federal courts should permit the prosecution of private claims under
the USHA.
Finally, the note examines the implications that a related issuewhether private plaintiffs may sue local housing authorities for alleged
violations of the USHA under 42 U.S.C. section 1983-may have on
USHA implied right of action analysis. 13 In light of the Supreme Court's
recent recognition, in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 14 of a section 1983 private remedy for alleged violations of
8. See generally Comment, No Implied Cause of Action Under the National Housing Act: A
Barrierto a Statutory Right, 22 URB. L. ANN. 249 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, No Implied Cause
of Action]. The comment was published prior to the reevaluation among the lower federal courts
concerning the existence of an implied right of action under the USHA. See also Comment, The
Brooke Amendment: Does "Shall Pay as Rent" Give Tenants a Right to Sue?, 37 MERCER L. REV.
1087 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, The Brooke Amendment]. This comment only discusses the
tenant's right to sue in federal court under the percentage-of-income rent ceiling provision, known as
the Brooke Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This note focuses on the
broader question of whether tenants may, as a general matter, bring private actions under various
provisions of the USHA. Inasmuch as the suits brought to date involve many issues unrelated to
rent grievances, the relevant issue is whether prospective tenant-plaint;ffs may maintain a private
right of action under the USHA regardless of the applicable provision of the Act or HUD
regulations.
For additional discussion of implied rights of action under the Brooke Amendment as an isolated USHA provision, see Note, Howard v. Pierce: Implied Causes of Action and the Ongoing
Vitality of Cort v. Ash, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 722 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Howard v. Pierce].
9. See infra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
11. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
12. See infra notes 45-95 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 96-128 and accompanying text.
14. 107 S. Ct. 766 (1987).
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the USHA,15 the note concludes that the USHA implied right of action
issue has bec'ome further confused. Nonetheless, the Court's analysis in
Wright, by indirectly addressing implied right of action issues, compels
the conclusion that private plaintiffs may seek redress of USHA violations not only via section 1983 actions but through more comprehensive
implied private actions under the USHA itself. 6 On this premise, the
note concludes that the federal courts should implement Congress's clear
intent by immediately recognizing an implied private right of action
under the USHA, thereby giving private plaintiffs remedies against the
full range of state and federal agency defendants.
I.

THE LAW OF IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION

The Supreme Court set forth the standards for implication of a private right of action in the seminal case of Cort v. Ash. 17 In Cort, the
plaintiff-shareholders brought a derivative suit based on the alleged violation by corporate directors of federal criminal statutes prohibiting certain
expenditures of corporate funds on behalf of political candidates.1 8 The
Court held that a private right of action could not be implied under the
statutes, which were enacted not for the benefit of shareholders but for
the protection of the public at large.1 9 The Court used the opportunity to
announce its now-familiar four-part test for the implication of private
rights of action under federal statutes:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted,"-that is, does the statute create a federal right in
favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to
20
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?

This test represented less a radical new articulation of doctrine than
a concrete synthesis of standards announced in prior case law. 2 1 Never15. Id. at 774.
16. See infra notes 129-63 and accompanying text.
17. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
18. Id. at 68.
19. Id. at 81-82.
20. Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
21. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-34 (1964) (Private enforcement provides a necessary and practical means to enforce the proxy solicitation regulations promulgated under section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)
("'[Where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy
upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage ....... (paraphrasing Anonymous, 6
Mod. 26, 26-27, 87 Eng. Rep. 791, 791 (Q.B. 1703)).
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theless, Cort failed to settle the law and instead triggered a ten-year
struggle within the Court over the appropriate reach of Cort's implied
22
private right of action doctrine.
In several post-Cort cases, the Court refined its four-part test and
appeared to narrow its scope. Disagreement over the propriety and
23
scope of the Cort test first appeared in Cannon v. University of Chicago,
in which the Court, by a six to three vote, upheld the implication of a
private right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972. In a concurring opinion, Justices Rehnquist and Stewart expressed
their view that direct inquiry into legislative intent was the dispositive
feature of the Cort test. 24 Justice Powell, in dissent, went even further
and directly argued for the abandonment of Cort in favor of a test de-

pending exclusively on directly discernible congressional intent. 25
Within months, this special emphasis on legislative intent won a

place in the Court's implied right of action doctrine. In Touche Ross &
22. See infra notes 23-36 and accompanying text. After Cort, there was considerable disagreement about the practical effect of the decision on the continuing ability of plaintiffs to bring lawsuits
in federal court based on implied causes of action. Compare Note, Implied Private Rights of Action-The Cort v. Ash Test-Interaction of "EspecialBeneficiary" and Legislative Intent, 24 WAYNE
L. REV. 1173, 1184-85 (1978) (Cort, despite its result as to the plaintiff-shareholders, signaled a
liberal attitude toward implication of pivate rights of action when plaintiffs are members of a beneficiary class, unless the language of the statute or the legislative history expressly indicates a different
legislative intent.) with Note, Implied Private Actions Under FederalStatutes-The Emergence ofa
Conservative Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429, 450-57 (1976) (criticizing Cort as imposing
unwarranted and highly restrictive test for the implication of private rights of action). See also
Mezey, JudicialInterpretationofLegislative Intent: The Role of the Supreme Court in the Implication ofPrivateRights ofAction, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 53, 76 (1983) (The Court has "clearly demonstrated [its] determination to stand fast against the onslaught of cases asserting a private right of
action."); Note, Howard v. Pierce, supra note 8, at 766 (After Cort, courts will "continue to play a
role in delineating proper enforcement measures," including implied private rights of action under
federal statutes.); Note, Third PartyBeneficiary andImplied Right of Action Analysis: The Fiction of
One Governmental Intent, 94 YALE L.J. 875, 876-77 (1985) (The Court's implied right of action
doctrine has become "increasingly stringent.") [hereinafter Note, ThirdParty Beneficiary]. It should
be noted that these last three publications all discuss the Court's implied private right of action
doctrine in light of post-Cort developments, which appear to restrict the reach of the Cort test.
23. 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). The Court partially based its holding on a finding that "Title IX
was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," id. at 694, under which the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had found an implied right of action 12 years before.
Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967).
Mezey notes that, one year before Cannon, eight of the justices had "assumed that Title VI [of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964] allowed a private right of action. Mezey, supra note 22, at 62 n.61 (citing
Regents of the University of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
24. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("IThis Court... should be extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action absent such specificity on the part of the Legislative
Branch.").
25. Id. at 749 (Powell, L, dissenting) ("[W]e should not condone the implication of any private
action ... absent the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact intended such an action to
exist.").
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Co. v. Redington, 26 the Court held that an implied private right of action
was not available under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Justice Rehnquist, now writing for the majority, almost exclusively emphasized statutory construction and legislative history. Finding
that both were silent as to a section 17(a) private remedy, the Court proceeded to hold that, because other sections of the Securities Exchange
Act expressly provided for private enforcement, implication of a private
27
cause of action was unwarranted.
For some commentators, Touche Ross represented a substantial alteration of the Cort approach; it appears to hold that inquiry into the
statute's express language and the legislative history constitutes a
"threshold" test-namely, that failure to satisfy the second prong of the
Cort test required immediate rejection of an implied cause of action,
without further inquiries into the other Cort factors. 28 This conclusion
was apparently reinforced when the Court reemphasized the importance
of "legislative intent" to the Cort analysis in TransamericaMortgageAdvisors, Inc. v. Lewis. 29 In a five-to-four decision, the Court rejected the
26. 442 U.S. 560, 569-70 (1979).
27. Id. at 571-72.
28. Justice White's dissent in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis explicitly treats
the Touche Ross Court's emphasis on express legislative intent as a threshold test, rather than a
complete abdication of Cort in favor of Justice Powell's suggested exclusive reliance on discernible
legislative intent. 444 U.S. 11, 34 n.10 (1979) (White, J., dissenting). See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Indeed, nowhere in Touche Ross or subsequent decisions did the Court explicitly reject
the Cort analysis in favor of an exclusive "express legislative intent" test. For a discussion of Transamerica, see infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
The Court's analysis in Touche Ross too easily brings one to the misleading conclusion that
silence on the private enforcement issue in the statute itself or the legislative history necessarily
"weights against implication," as some commentators have stated. See, e.g., Comment, No Implied
Cause of Action, supra note 8, at 260. Such a reading suggests a marked departure from the Cannon
Court's holding that "in situations . .. 'in which it is clear that federal law has granted a class of
persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action,
although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would be controlling.'" 441 U.S. at 694
(quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975)). "[T]he Court has long recognized that under certain
limited circumstances the failure of Congress [to provide for a private right of action] is not inconsistent with an intent on its part to have such a remedy available to the persons benefited by its legislation." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717. Touche Ross should not be read to hold that complete
congressional silence on the issue of private enforcement automatically triggers rejection of a private
remedy; the decision does not so state, thus preserving the quite different inference suggested by the
quoted language from Cannon. Instead, Touche Ross merely stands for the proposition that Congress has not been silent when it has affirmatively provided for private enforcement in other sections
of the relevant statute, while remaining silent on the question in the particular section under which
plaintiffs are suing. As a matter of statutory construction, reference to the entire legislative scheme,
by negative implication, constitutes positive evidence of legislative intent. See supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
This subtle distinction is particularly important on the issue of whether to imply a private right
of action under the USHA. See infra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
29. 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979).
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implication of a private damages action under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940,30 holding that the statutory enforcement scheme was so
comprehensive that it was highly unlikely that Congress intended to per31
mit private actions under the Act.
The Supreme Court's strong emphasis on legislative intent also appeared in subsequent implied right of action cases. 32 Nevertheless, while
the post-Cort cases clearly represent both a restrictive approach to the
implication of private rights of action and "the Court's determination to
stand fast against the onslaught of cases asserting a private right of action,"'3 3 the Court has declined to adopt Justice Powell's suggested rejection of Cort in favor of exclusive reliance on express congressional
intent.3 4 Instead, in a typical recent implied right of action decision, the
Court reaffirmed the Cort test, characterizing it (in light of post-Cort
cases) as the appropriate means for determining congressional intent.35
It is in this context, of an implied right of action doctrine still in flux and
hotly debated by members of the Court,3 6 that the lower courts have
addressed the USHA implied right of action question.
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1982).
31. 444 U.S. at 20. Like Touche Ross, the Transamerica decision is easily read too broadly.
The Transamerica Court did not hold that congressional provision ofsome enforcement mechanisms
automatically precludes private enforcement, but instead held that the existence of a comprehensive
statutory enforcement scheme precludes implication of a private right of action. In this vein, Touche
Ross and Transamerica collapse the second and third Cort factors into a single exercise in statutory
construction. The cases merely stand for the proposition that, taken as a whole, statutes may be so
comprehensive (Transamerica)or so cleir in their provisions for and (implicit) exclusions of private
enforcement (Touche Ross) that legislative intent to exclude private enforcement is easily inferred.
When such an inference is possible, an essential element of the Cort test is missing, and implication
of a private remedy is rejected. See supra note 28. This does not mean that the availability of other
enforcement mechanisms defeats private enforcement, but instead that it is an important factor to be
considered in determining the existence of an implied cause of action. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
32. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 3234-35 n.9,
(1986) (reviewing post-Cort cases that stressed strict fidelity to congressional intent in implied right
of action cases); Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984) ("[O]ur focus must be on
the intent of Congress when it enacted the statute in question."); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377 (1982) ("Our cases subsequent to [Cort] have plainly stated
that our focus must be on 'the intent of Congress.' "); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) ("Our focus, ais it is in any case involving the implication of a right of
action, is on the intent of Congress."); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981)
("[Ul]Itimate issue is whether Congress intended to create a private right of action .. "); Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981) (The dispositive question is
"whether Congress intended to create the private remedy."); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu,
450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981) (Implied right of action analysis requires an inquiry into discernible legislativc intent.).
33. Mezey, supra note 22, at 76.
34. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
35. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984).
36. Every implied right of action case to reach the Supreme Court since Cort, with the exception of Daily Income Fund, has been decided by a five-to-four or six-to-three margin.
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The district and circuit courts have reached widely differing results
when called upon to imply private rights of action under the USHA.
One court of appeals-the Sixth Circuit 37-has implied a private right of
action while two others-the Fourth Circuit 38 and the Eleventh Cir37. Howard v. Pierce, 738 F.2d 722 (6th Cir. 1984). The primary difficulty for the Howard
court was that "nowhere in the legislative history [had it] uncovered an expression of intent either to
provide or deny a private means of enforcing the Brooke Amendment." Id. at 727 (citation omitted). The court's approach to this problem highlights the fundamental implied right of action issue.
The key to the Howard court's application of Cort lay not in its failure to find affirmative evidence of
congressional intent per se, but in its treatment of the apparent absence of explicit or implicit legislative consideration of the private enforcement issue. The court argued that "legislative silence...
support[s] the conclusion that Congress did not intend to deny the intended beneficiaries of the
Brooke Amendment a private cause of action" and that "no further conclusions concerning Congress' intent can be made convincingly from the legislative history of the Act." Id. at 728.
The conclusion was critical inasmuch as without it the court could not have proceeded to consideration of the third and fourth Cort factors. Had the court decided that the post-Cort cases
required rejection of an implied right of action upon aprimafaciefinding of "congressional silence,"
or that there was indeed some affirmative legislative intent to deny a right of private enforcement
under the USHA, then the case would have been decided on the second Cort factor alone. Instead,
under its "no intent to deny" approach, the court was free to conclude, after appropriate consideration of the statutory scheme set up under the USHA, that an implied private right of action would
"further the primary goal of ensuring that low income familes are provided with decent, safe housing." Id. at 730. The court permitted the plaintiff to go forward on her implied right of action and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 731.
38. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 771 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 107
S. Ct. 766 (1987); Phelps v. Housing Auth., 742 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1984); Perry v. Housing Auth.,
664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981).
Of these decisions, only Perry and Phelps include any direct discussion of the controlling Cort
test's application in the context of a lawsuit brought under the USHA or related HUD regulations.
The Perry court made an inexplicable inferential leap in concluding that the extent of local authority
over federally assisted housing projects represents affirmative evidence that Congress intended to
foreclose private enforcement of the USHA. The court argued that the structure of the program and
its sparse legislative history made it "plain that the federal enactments sought to create neither rights
in the tenants nor duties in the landlords." 664 F.2d at 1215. It is far from clear that this constitutes
evidence that Congress intended that private redress of local or federal failures to comply with the
terms of the USHA or HUD regulations be foreclosed to injured tenants. The court reached a
wholly untenable conclusion: local control over public housing contracts itself establishes the absence of enforceable federal rights in low income tenants. The argument is unpersuasive because it
ties together two totally unrelated concepts: the mechanical structure of the USHA program and
legislative intent as to private enforcement of the Act.
Because the court's analysis of the second Cort factor is exclusively limited to this fatally flawed
argument, Perry ultimately lends little or no guidance on the question of congressional intent. As a
practical matter, the court failed to discuss the issue at all.
In addition, the Perry court's formulation inexplicably imputes to the Supreme Court utter
redundancy in separating out the third and fourth Cort factors as distinct avenues of necessary
inquiry. The Perry analysis is therefore flawed, insofar as it flies in the face of any reasonable reading
of Cort and the post-Cort decisions, which themselves undertake direct analysis of statutory schemes
of enforcement and their compatability with the implication of implied private rights of acti3n.
For a discussion of related flaws in the district court's opinion in Perry, 486 F. Supp. 498
(D.S.C. 1980), see Comment, No Implied Cause of Action, supra note 8, at 265-68.
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Cuit 39-have refused to imply a private right of action. In addition, one
district court has implied a private right of action, 4° and two have refused to imply a private right of action under the USHA. 4 1 The remaining federal courts that have ruled on the question have undertaken no
independent analysis, relying instead on available precedents or an indirect denial of an implied right of action.4 2
Analysis of the question is clearly complicated by confusion in the
lower courts over the appropriate application of Cort v. Ash and subsequent cases4 3 and by the close relationship to the implied right of action
issue of another difficult question-whether plaintiffs can bring an action
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for alleged violations of the USHA. 44
39. Nelson v. Greater Gadsden Hous. Auth., 802 F.2d 405, 407 (11th Cir. 1986) ("It is now
clear in this Circuit that tenants in Federal Public Housing have ... [no] implied private right of
action to enforce the rent provisions of the Brooke Amendment."); Brown v. Housing Auth., 784
F.2d 1533, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 1986) (following the Fourth Circuit's application of the Cort factors in
Perry).
40, Silva v. East Providence Hous. Auth., 423 F. Supp. 453, 464-65 (D.R.I. 1976) (allowing
prospective tenants of lower-rent housing to bring an action against HUD for terminating a building
contract), rev'd on other grounds, 565 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1977).
41. Stone v. District of Columbia, 572 F. Supp. 976, 978-80 (D.D.C. 1983) (finding no strong
evidence of congressional intent to create private right of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1437a);
McGhee v. Housing Auth., 543 F. Supp. 607, 608-10 (M.D. Ala. 1982) (same).
42. See, e-g., Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Because
the plaintiffs can redress [the USHA] violation in a section 1983 action, we need not ... consider
whether the plaintiffs could also succeed under their constitutional, implied private right of action
... theor[y]."); Beckham v. New York City Hous. Auth., 755 F.2d 1074, 1076-77 (2d Cir. 1985)
(implied right of action rejected without discussion of Cort factors); Davis v. City of Toledo, 54
F.R.D. 386, 388 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (discussing section 1983 remedies alone).
43. See supra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
44. For a full discussion of the problems posed by the similarity of the section 1983 and implied
right of action issues, see infra notes 96-161 and accompanying text. The section 1983 claims have
apparently arisen as a result of fears on the part of many plaintiffs that the federal courts will refuse
to imply private rights of action, in light of facially restrictive post-Cortdecisions. See Mezey, supra
note 22, at 76-88.
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute.., of any State or Territory ... subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (emphasis added). In general, plaintiffs have argued that local housing
authorities are subject to section 1983 claims because they act under the authority of state law and
therefore become amenable to suit for any action inconsistent with the USHA or related HUD
regulations. See, e.g., Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 107 S. Ct. 766, 769-70
(1987). For a full discussion of Wright and its implications for USHA implied right of action analysis, see infra notes 109-63 and accompanying text. For present purposes, it suffices to note that
Wright did not present the USHA implied right of action question. The Wright Court only recognized the validity of a section 1983 action against local housing authorities and did not explicitly
address the implication problem. Id. at 774. The USHA implied private right of action question
thus remains a live issue. Prospective plaintiffs with claims against HUD, for example, will not be
able to take advantage of the permissibility of a section 1983 claim, because section 1983 only applies
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Judges have differed over whether the four-part test of Cort v. Ash continues to apply, and whether it is still necessary in any case to apply all
four Cort factors. The issue, therefore, presents unsettled questions requiring further analysis under prevailing law.
II.

THE EXISTENCE OF AN IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION
UNDER THE

A.

USHA

The ContinuingApplicability of Cort v. Ash.

The threshold question is whether the Cort v. Ash test still provides
the proper framework for analysis of implied right of action questions.
The Supreme Court has not overruled Cort, either expressly or impliedly.4 5 The relevant issue, therefore, is the extent to which post-Cort
decisions have altered the implied right of action doctrine. A review of
the decisions reveals that while the Court has placed special emphasis on
discerning legislative intent, the Cort test remains fundamentally intact.
Touche Ross, Transamerica, and subsequent decisions reemphasized
the Cort formulation's focus on discerning legislative intent. Yet neither
decision repudiates the basic Cort framework. Instead, the Court gradually has redirected the focus of its implied right of action doctrine toward
issues that were always at the heart of Cort.
It is true that in Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth four factors that it
considered "relevant" in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one. But the Court did not
decide that each of these factors is entitled to equal weight. The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to46create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action.
This suggests that the Cort test should now itself be considered a means
of discerning probable legislative intent; in other words, the question of
congressional intent is no longer merely one element of the test, but the
object of analysis under all four Cort factors. Cort controls the implication of private rights under the USHA, and the proper approach is to
apply its test, taking care to "focus carefully on 'the intent of
to state actors, not federal actors. These plaintiffs will therefore continue to argue that an implied
private right of action exists under the USHA.
The Supreme Court decided Wright against the background of its own repeated recognition of
the validity of section 1983 actions premised on alleged violations of various federal statutes. The
standards for permitting such actions were announced in Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1 (1981); and Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
For further discussion of the section 1983 issue, see Mezey, supra note 22, at 76-88; Comment,
The Brooke Amendment, supra note 8, at 1104-09.
45. Indeed, in a recent implied right of action case, the Court reaffirmed the Cort test. See
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1984).
46. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979).
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Congress.' ,,47
This characterization of the proper application of Cort is crucial to
an understanding of the flaws in some courts' discussion of the implied
right of action question; and in fact, it shows that none of the lower federal courts, including those that have reached a result compatible with
that suggested later in this note, have appropriately analyzed the USHA
implied right of action question. If the Cort factors, as suggested above
and confirmed by the Court itself, collectively represent "criteria.. .primarily focused on the intent of Congress in enacting the statute under
review,"'4 8 courts should undertake an exhaustive analysis of all four elements of the Cort test whenever they are confronted with an implied
private right of action problem. In other words, it is not the case that the
second factor of the original Cort test, which requires examination of any
evidence of congressional intent in the statute itself or the legislative history, is now the sole meaningful or dispositive reference point. Instead, it
should be understood that courts are still compelled to "carefully analyze
the four factors that Cort identifies as indicative of [legislative] intent."49
It is in this context that this note undertakes an analysis of the USHA
implied private right of action question.
B. Application of the Cort Test.
1. Are Tenants Members of the Special Class of Citizens Congress
Intended to Benefit? There is little question that lower-income families-the tenants or prospective tenants of USHA-assisted housing
projects-are the intended beneficiaries of the Act. The initial reference
point is the USHA policy declaration, which is phrased in language "expressly identiffying] the class Congress intended to benefit."' 50 The legislature explicitly intended "to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing
conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings
47. Stone v. District of Columbia, 572 F. Supp. 976, 979 (D.D.C. 1983) (quoting Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377 (1982)). As this note later explains, infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text, the elevation of legislative intent to special importance in the Cort analysis does not itself suggest what conclusion should be drawn when no
legislative intent-either to create or deny an implied private right of action-is readily discernible
from statutory language or legislative history. The following discussion suggests that, although the
lower federal courts are correct that the question of legislative intent has taken on especial significance in implication analysis, they have erred in concluding that the absence of direct congressional
expressions of intent should automatically result in rejection of an implied private right of action.
48. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377 (1982).
49. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979) (emphasis added); see also Daily
Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1984) (characterizing Cort factors collectively as
indicia of legislative intent).
50. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690.
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for families of lower income , 5 1 This policy statement alone, of course,
does not create "enforceable rights" in lower-income families eligible or
prospectively eligible for tenancy in federally-assisted housing. Nevertheless, the substantive provisions of the USHA that follow the policy
statement confer particular benefits on the assisted class also. The
USHA's percentage-of-income rent ceilings,5 2 for example, clearly constitute "a direct mandate, creating both a right of tenants to limitations
on rent and a duty of landlords and housing authorities to ensure reduced rent."' 53 By providing that tenants "shall pay as rent" the prescribed maximum percentages of their income, 54 the statute affirmatively
commands that tenants shall be free from the assessment of monthly rent
deemed excessive as a matter of federal policy. It is precisely this kind of
right- or duty-creating language that is dispositive under the first Cort
factor. It is, therefore, impossible to argue that the intended beneficiaries
of the provision were persons other than existing or prospective tenants
of public housing assisted under the USHA.
Other provisions of the USHA establish that the primary beneficiaries of the statute-those persons in whom the Act vests affirmative
rights-are lower-income families in need of decent, affordable housing.
For example, the USHA variously provides for local housing authorities'
establishment, as a precondition of federal assistance, of "tenant selection
criteria which give[ ] preference to families which [currently] occupy substandard housing";5 5 for the promulgation by HUD of regulations requiring local housing authorities to establish and "fully and effectively
[enforce]" acceptable "standards of tenant security"; 56 and for "the development by local housing authority managements of viable homeownership opportunity programs for lower income families." '57 Each of these
provisions redounds with particularity to "the benefit of a special
class."' 58 This conclusion is reinforced by additional language in the
USHA, broadly defining the types of housing eligible for federal assistance 59-a definition expressly adopted "[flor the purpose of aiding lower51. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982) (emphasis added).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (the "Brooke Amendment").
53. Note, Howard v. Pierce, supra note 8, at 751.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(C) (1982); see also 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(e) (1987) (HUD regulations
mandating inclusion of minimum safety and upkeep provisions in leases between tenants and local
housing authorities).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(D) (1982).
58. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (Supp. III 1985) ("[A]ssistance payments may be made with respect to existing housing ....
); cf 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (1982) ("[A]ssistance payments may be
made with respect to existing, newly constructed, and substantially rehabilitated housing .... ").
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income families in obtaining a decent place to live." '60
Indeed, the entire statute is explicitly written with an eye toward
benefiting lower-income families in general and public housing tenants in
particular. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the lower federal courts
have almost universally agreed that lower-income tenants are the "especial class" benefited under the Act. 6 1 And as Justice Stevens carefully
noted in Cannon, statutory language that is drawn with the particular
purpose of benefiting a discrete class of persons-thereby creating rights
in that class and imposing duties on its behalf-is "generally... the most
'62
accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action."
Thus, the USHA by its terms satisfies the first element of the Cort test.
2. The Language of the Statute and Its Legislative History as Indicia of Congressional Intent. As the courts that have considered the
USHA implied right of action problem have repeatedly noted, 63 the statutory language and the available legislative history contain little or no
evidence of congressional intent either to grant or to deny tenants an
implied private right of action. Only two decisions-Howardv. Pierce64
and McGhee v. Housing Authority of Lanett 6 5-find any indication on
the face of the statute of whether Congress intended to permit private
enforcement of the USHA. The Howard and McGhee courts each noted
that Congress had provided that HUD "may sue and be sued ...with
respect to its functions under the United States Housing Act of 1937."66
In Howard, Judge Celebrezze was only able to read this sovereign immunity waiver as "some evidence of a general intent to permit an action
against HUD," but not as an indication of "[w]hether Congress intended
private enforcement of [the USHA]. ' '67 Similarly, in McGhee, Judge
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (Supp. III 1985).
61. See, e.g., Howard v. Pierce, 738 F.2d 722, 725 (6th Cir. 1984) (Lower-income tenants are
"the intended beneficiaries of the Broake Amendment in particular and [the USHA] in general.");
Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 509 (1st Cir. 1979) ("Low and moderate income tenants
are indisputably the prime beneficiaries of the National Housing Act."); M.B. Guran Co. v. City of
Akron, 546 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1976) (The USHA was enacted for the benefit of "persons who
inhabit inadequate housing."); Stone v.District of Columbia, 572 F. Supp. 976, 980 (D.D.C. 1983)
("To be sure, [lower-income tenants] are among the intended beneficiaries of Section 1437a .... );
McGhee v. Housing Auth., 543 F. Supp. 607, 608 (M.D. Ala. 1982) (Public housing tenants appear
to have a "vested... property right to public housing at the rental rate" specified by law.); cf Perry
v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1213 (4th Cir. 1981) (Tenants are only indirect beneficiaries of the
USHA; a direct benefit is conferred only on states and local housing authorities.).
62, Cannon, 441 U.S, at 690 n.13.
63. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
64. 738 F.2d 722 (6th Cir. 1984); see supra note 37.
65. 543 F. Supp. 607 (M.D. Ala. 1982); see supra note 41.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1404a (1982); see Howard, 738 F.2d at 727; McGhee, 543 F. Supp. at 609 n.l.
67. 738 F.2d at 727-28. The Howard court also failed to find any indication of congressional
intent on the private enforcement issue in the legislative history of the USHA. See supra note 37.
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Varner conceded that while the "provision may indicate a congressional
intent to allow suit against [HUD], it cannot be read to be an indication
of congressional intent to allow private actions against local public housing authorities. ' 68 In the latter case, however, the court's language is
clearly dicta, since plaintiffs had not attempted to join HUD as a
defendant.
Even. if the courts are correct in their interpretation of the provision,
the point is helpful only in a limited way. No matter how it is applied,
this sovereign immunity waiver leaves two fundamental questions unanswered: whether a local housing authority can be sued, 69 and, in any
event, who may sue an agency (including HUD) under the implied private right of action. The legislative history is devoid of guidance even as
to the scope of the waiver provision. In examining the USHA and its
legislative history, the courts have been confronted with a graphic illustration of the Supreme Court's observation that "the legislative history of
a statute that does not expressly create or deny a private remedy will
'70
typically be equally silent or ambignous on the question.
The dispositive question therefore is what consequences should follow from "congressional silence." In addressing this question obvious
analytical difficulties appear among the lower court opinions. Some
courts have held that congressional silence automatically requires rejection of the asserted implied right of action, while others have held that
7
silence merely requires further analysis under the Cort test. 1
The flaw in the former conclusion is readily apparent. Had Congress "spoken," the issue of "implication" would be moot or could
hardly be said to have arisen in the first place. Undertaking implication
analysis necessarily presupposes the absence of express congressional
treatment of the private enforcement question. The significance of the
second Cort factor, therefore, is that it draws courts' attention to any
indirect evidence of congressional intent in the statute itself or its legislative history. To attempt to draw conclusions from the same facial congressional silence that gives rise to the need for implication analysis in
the first instance begs the question.
In this sense, absolute reliance on the presence or absence of direct
expressions of congressional intent undermines the entire foundation of
Cort v. Ash. But the Court has not overruled Cort, and has instead chosen to repeat that, in order to imply a private right of action under a
68. 543 F. Supp. at 609 n.1.
69. Both courts held that local housing authorities could not be sued on an implied right of
action theory under the USHA. See Howard, 738 F.2d at 730; McGhee, 543 F. Supp. at 610.
70. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979).
71. See supra notes 17-42 and accompanying text.
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given federal statute, "'it is not necessary to show an intention to create
a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause
of action would be controlling.' ",72 The post-Cort cases cannot and
should not be read to alter this rule. 73 Even in its most restrictive implied right of action decisions the Court has expressly recognized:
[W]hile the absence of anything in the legislative history that indicates
an intention to confer any private right of action is hardly helpful to
the [plaintiff], it does not automatically undermine his position...
[T]he failure of Congress expressly to consider a private remedy is not
inevitably inconsistent with an intent on itspart to make such a remedy
available. Such an intent may appear implicitly in the language74 or
structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of its enactment.
On the particular question of whether an implied right of action exists under the USHA, therefore, a completion of the Cort analysis is required, even under the Court's more restrictive decisions. Essentially,
congressional silence leads to the wholly unremarkable conclusion that
courts must look elsewhere-to indicia of congressional intent other than
the language of the statute itself or the legislative history-to complete
the analysis and reach a supportable conclusion on any given implied
right of action question. This was and still is the essence of Cort-an
analytical distinction that has been ignored by those courts which
reached their decisions after consideration of the statutory language and
the legislative history materials alone.
3. The "Statutory Scheme." The third Cort factor requires examination of whether it is "consistent with the underlying purposes of the
'75
legislative scheme to imply ... a [private] remedy for the plaintiff."
This prong of the Cort test has been characterized as involving "the answers to two questions: (1) will private remedies interfere with the discretionary actions of the administrative agency [here, HUD], and (2) are
the agency's own enforcement mechanisms adequate to protect the inter72. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975)).
73. See supra notes 28 & 31.
74. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). The Touche Ross
Court also recognized that the Cort factors collectively address the central question of legislative
intent, Id. at 575-76, and decided the case merely on the grounds that "the plain language of the
statutory provision weighs against implication of a private remedy." Id. at 571 (emphasis added),
Given this latter finding, Touche Ross indeed cannot be read as considering the question of appropriate analysis in the face of "congressional silence" at all; the holding clearly follows from an entirely
different situation, in which Congress was not "silent." See supra note 28.
Touche Ross and Transamerica nevertheless do stand for the proposition that congressional
silence does not permit courts freely to "consider the utility of a private remedy." Transamerica,
444 U,S, at 23. This note does not take issue with that conclusion.
75. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
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ests of the plaintiffs?" 76 From this point of reference, examination of the
USHA "statutory scheme" shows that an implied private right of action
is consistent with Congress's purpose in enacting the statute.
The issue is whether the USHA statutory scheme is constructed
such that private enforcement in a federal forum furthers the role Congress expected HUD and local housing authorities to play in carrying out
the goals of a low-income public housing assistance program. As in
Transamerica, the statutory enforcement scheme may be so extensive
that Congress cannot reasonably be said to have expected that private
enforcement was either necessary or prudent. 77 But when a statute provides few or no mechanisms through which the primary right holders can
vindicate their claims, private enforcement may be "necessary or at least
'78
helpful to the accomplishment of the statutory purpose.
At least one court has correctly noted that "[c]onspicuously absent
from the [USHA] are private enforcement mechanisms. ' 79 While HUD
is itself given the right to "sue and be sued" under provisions of the
USHA,80 it is far from clear that this gives tenants the right to privately
enforce the USHA in federal courts, especially when their grievances involve the acts (or failures to act) of local housing authorities. 8 ' Under
HUD regulations, however, tenants are putatively granted a right to
challenge local housing authority action.8 2
Even a cursory glance at the regulations, however, reveals that this
grievance hearing remedy is extremely limited and of little practical
value. The grievance procedure is available only to current tenants of
federally assisted housing projects; 8 3 prospective tenants with grievances,
such as those in Silva v. East Providence Housing Authority,8 4 are therefore left with no administrative remedy under the regulations. In any
event, local housing authorities appear to be free to ignore the results of a
hearing under the grievance procedure,8 5 leaving complainants with no
76. Note, Howard v. Pierce, supra note 8, at 753-54.
77. For a discussion of Transamerica in this regard, see supra notes 29-31 and accompanying
text.
78. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979). Justice Stevens characterized
the Court as "decidedly receptive" to implication of a private cause of action in these circumstances.
Id.
79. Howard v. Pierce, 738 F.2d 722, 729 (6th Cir. 1984).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1404a (1982).

81. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
82. 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.50-966.59 (1987).
83. 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.51(a), 966.53(f) (1987).
84. 423 F. Supp. 453 (D.R.I. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 565 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1977).
85. The grievance procedure regulations provide, in relevant part:
(b) The decision of the hearing officer or hearing panel shall be binding on the [local
housing authority] which shall take all actions, or refrain from any actions, necessary to
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alternative but to seek judicial relief. Perhaps most important, the grievance procedure does not provide for action against HUD itself, leaving
plaintiffs whose complaints directly involve HUD action (or inaction),
like those in Howard v. Pierce,86 no administrative recourse.
In these kinds of circumstances implication of a private right of action on behalf of the primary statutory beneficiaries is most appropriate.
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,87 the Supreme Court emphasized
that enforcement mechanisms under Title IX of the Education Amendments were especially inadequate, giving rise to the inference that Congress had implicitly contemplated that private enforcement would
supplement the statutory scheme. In the case of the USHA, the argument appears to be even stronger. Without the right to seek private enforcement of the Act's provisions, tenants and prospective tenants would
be left with no recourse in the face of violations of the USHA or related
HUD regulations by HUD itself or a local housing authority. Even in
the Court's most restrictive implied right of action cases, it has refused to
allow private enforcement only when there is "evidence to support the
view" that the statutory enforcement scheme "was intended to provide
88
the exclusive remedy" for violations of statutory beneficiaries' rights.
When, as under the USHA, the statute leaves open the possibility that a
number of grievances cannot be remedied, it is far more likely that Congress intended to permit private enforcement.
Without an implied private right of action, lower-income beneficiaries of the USHA would be left without a remedy in many unacceptable circumstances. Tenants and prospective tenants could not, for
example, challenge HUD regulations that left loopholes through which
local housing authorities could charge rents in excess of the maximums
prescribed in the Brooke Amendment. 89 Nor could they seek injunctive
relief when a landlord failed to provide adequate grievance procedures in
carry out the decision unless the [localhousing authority] determines within a reasonable
time, and promptly notifies the complainant of its determination, that
(2) The decision of the hearing officer or hearing panel is contrary to applicable Federal,
State or local law, HUD regulations or requirements of the annual contributions contract
between HUD and the [local housing authority].
24 C.F.R, § 966.57(b) (1987) (emphasis added).
86. 738 F,2d 722 (6th Cir. 1984). For discussion of the claim presented in Howard, see supra
note 37.
87, 441 U.S, 677, 708 n.42 (1979) (noting that HEW candidly admitted lack of resources necessary to enforce Title IX).
88, Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 573 (1979) (emphasis added) (discussing
statutorily created remedies for violations of Securities Exchange Act's proscription of material misstatements in proxy solicitations).
89. See Howard, 738 F.2d at 728-29.
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tenant leases as specified by HUD regulations. 90 Whatever the scenario,
the crucial point is not that private enforcement is desirable,but that the
lack of alternatives in the statutory scheme gives rise to a strong inference that Congress intended to permit private causes of action in lieu
.thereof Therefore, private enforcement of the USHA is consistent with
the established mechanisms through which Congress sought to further
the USHA's stated purposes.
4. The Prospective Claims as Matters "Best Left to the States."
The final Cort factor requires an examination of whether implication of a
private right of action under the USHA would result in interference with
matters "traditionally relegated to state law." 9 1 The USHA policy declaration 92 makes it clear that, through the Act, "the federal government
'93 The USHA
...assumed responsibility for housing the nation's poor."
represents a congressional determination that lower-income housing
problems are necessarily a national concern.
The conclusion of some lower federal courts that USHA-related disputes exclusively present questions of state landlord/tenant law94 is
flawed for two reasons. First, not all possible violations of the USHA or
HUD regulations necessarily involve breaches of a lease between a local
housing authority and a plaintiff-tenant. 95 Second, and more important,
even grievances over leases have been conclusively made federal questions by the USHA. Any given dispute may involve not only construction of specific provisions of the USHA or HUD regulations, but also
consideration of the USHA's underlying policies and purpose. Those
courts holding that USHA claims present landlord/tenant questions
alone have simply not gone far enough. The hypothetical plaintiff, proceeding on an implied right of action under the USHA, is not suing on
his lease alone; he is alleging the breach of federal policy through the
violation of specific provisions of the statute representing that policy. In
this sense, landlord/tenant law, while not irrelevant, is clearly a secondary issue.
The central issue presented by an implied right of action under the
USHA is, by the terms of the statute, a matter which cannot be said to
implicate concerns traditionally relegated to state law. Thus, under the
fourth Cort factor, it is appropriate to permit an implied right of action
under the USHA to go forward.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See 24 C.F.R. § 966.50 (1987).
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982).
Note, Howard v. Pierce, supra note 8, at 755.
See, e.g., Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1216 (4th Cir. 1981).
See, e.g., Howard v. Pierce, 738 F.2d 722 (6th Cir. 1984).
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III. SECTION 1983 AND IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
UNDER THE USHA

The series of lower court cases addressing the related questions of
whether an implied private right of action exists under the USHA 96 and
whether private plaintiffs can seek redress of USHA violations via section
1983 civil rights actions 97 culminated recently with the Supreme Court's
decision in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority. 98 In Wright, the Court held that the plaintiffs could maintain an
action against local housing authorities, under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,
for alleged violations of the USHA. 99 The Court did not, however, discuss the broader implied private right of action question. While much of
the Court's analysis of the section 1983 issue is relevant for resolution of
the implied right of action problem, 1°0 the Court's failure to address the
latter issue squarely leaves troublesome questions unanswered and in fact
serves only to confuse the entire USHA private enforcement problem.
This note concludes that the Wright Court should have addressed and
settled the implied private right of action issue, and, moreover, that the
Court's result could not have been reached without tacit recognition of
the existence of an implied private right of action under the USHA.
A.

Section 1983 Actions to Enforce Federal Statutes.

In Maine v. Thtboutot,10 1 the Supreme Court held that section 1983
is available to plaintiffs seeking redress of alleged violations of federal
statutes by state actors. As with the Court's implied right of action decisions, 10 2 the Thiboutot Court opened the federal courthouse doors to
hundreds of private plaintiffs for whom relief from violations of federal
statutes was previously unavailable. The Thiboutot Court apparently
recognized a damage remedy for all violations of a federal statute by
state officials, "includ[ing] official failure to comply with federal requirements in the operation of programs of federal-state cooperation."1 0 3 Presumably, therefore, the section 1983 remedy recognized in Thiboutot
extended to violations even of purely remedial social welfare statutes like
96. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
98. 107 S. Ct. 766 (1987).
99. Id. at 769.
100. See infra notes 129-63 and accompanying text.
101. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
102. See supra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
103. H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
ed. 1987).

POLICY AND PRACTICE

779-80 (2nd
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the USHA. 1 4
In subsequent decisions, however, the Court restricted the reach of
Thiboutot by exempting at least two broad categories of federal statutes
from coverage under the. section 1983 remedy. In PennhurstState School
and Hospital v. Halderman,10 the Court held that the section 1983 remedy covers violations only of federal statutes that vested "substantive
rights" in the putative plaintiffs.10 6 In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 107 the Court further restricted the reach of Thiboutot by holding that relief is unavailable when
Congress has directly or indirectly expressed an intent to foreclose the
section 1983 remedy. The Court concluded that congressional intent to
preclude section 1983 enforcement of a federal statute may be found in a
particularly comprehensive independent scheme of enforcement in the
statute itself. 108 Thus, remedial statutes might not be subject to private
enforcement via section 1983 actions, given the Middlesex presumption
that Congress intended to foreclose section 1983 enforcement when the
statute at issue includes its own broad enforcement provisions.
Thiboutot, Pennhurstand Middlesex appear to represent a relatively
straightforward standard: plaintiffs may seek relief, via a section 1983
action, for violations by state actors of a federal statute that creates substantive rights in the plaintiffs, so long as Congress has not expressly or
impliedly foreclosed section 1983 enforcement. Nevertheless, it remains
unclear whether section 1983 remedies are available in the specific context of remedial statutes, like the USHA, which are ambiguous in the
conferral of substantive rights and virtually silent on the issue of private
enforcement. It was in this setting that the Court decided, in Wright v.
City of Roanoke Redevelopment & HousingAuthority,10 9 whether section
1983 relief is available for violations of the USHA by state officials.

104. Indeed, in his dissent in Thiboutot, Justice Powell listed the USHA as one of the remedial
statutes that might be covered by the section 1983 remedy recognized by the majority opinion.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 11 app. at 36 (Powell, J., dissenting).
105. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
106. Id. at 21. As to the specific statute involved in Pennhurst-theDevelopmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act-the Court held that a "Patient Bill of Rights" included in the Act
was not intended by Congress to give patients any substantive rights or impose any affirmative duties
on the states. Id. at 21-22.
107. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
108. Id. at 21.
109. 107 S. Ct. 766 (1987).
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Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing
Authority.

The Wright Court considered a section 1983 action brought by the
tenants of an USHA-assisted, lower-income housing project in Roanoke,
Virginia against the local public housing authority for alleged violations
of the rent limitations of the USHA's Brooke Amendment. 110 The plaintiffs claimed that, under prior case law and various HUD regulations,
rent surcharges for tenants' utility usage fell within the definition of
"rent" under the Brooke Amendment, and that excessive utility
surcharges imposed by local authorities therefore constituted violations
of the Amendment's rent ceilings.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia' and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit' 12
rejected the plaintiffs' claims, on the ground that no section 1983 cause of
action existed to redress alleged violations of the Brooke Amendment by
local public housing authorities. Relying on previous Fourth Circuit
cases reaching a similar result,'1 3 both courts concluded that private enforcement of the USHA was unavailable through either an implied private right of action or a section 1983 suit against local public housing
authorities.
In a five-to-four decision, in which Justice White wrote for the majority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court holding. 1 4 The
Court applied the Thiboutot, Pennhurst and Middlesex tests and concluded that "the benefits Congress intended to confer on tenants are sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as enforceable rights under
Pennhurstand § 1983, rights that are not.., beyond the competence of
the judiciary to enforce," 1 1 5 and that "nothing in the Housing Act or the
Brooke Amendment evidences that Congress intended to preclude [the
plaintiffs'] § 1983 claim." 1 16 For the Court, these holdings led to the
conclusion that a section 1983 cause of action was available to enforce
the Brooke Amendment's rent limitations.
In reaching its decision, the Wright Court undertook a bifurcated
analysis: first, under Middlesex, of whether Congress had expressly or
110.

Id. at 768-70; see 42 U.S.C. § 1437a (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (the "Brooke Amendment").
S11. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 605 F. Supp. 532, 536 (W.D. Va. 1984).
112. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 771 F.2d 833, 873 n.9 (4th Cir. 1985).
113. See Pbelps v. Housing Auth., 742 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1984); Perry v. Housing Auth., 664
F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981). Phelps and Perry are discussed in detail at supra note 38 and accompanying text.
114. 107 S. Ct. at 768-69.
115. Id. at 775.
116. Id. at 774.
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impliedly precluded section 1983 enforcement,1 17 and second, under Pen-

nhurst, of whether enforceable rights were created in tenants via the
Brooke Amendment.1 18 The Court's preclusion analysis began with the
restatement of a strong presumption against preclusion of section 1983
enforcement. 19 The Court found that the respondent housing authority
had failed to defeat this presumption, which by its terms shifts the bur1 20
den of persuasion on the preclusion issue to state actor defendants.
As an initial matter, the Court found in the USHA no express grant

of judicial remedies or comprehensive remedial schemes like those which,
in Middlesex and Smith, had triggered a presumption of congressional
intent to foreclose independent section 1983 enforcement.1 2 1 "Indeed,

the only private remedy provided for [in the Brooke Amendment or elsewhere in the USHA] is the local grievance procedures which the Act now
requires." 122 More important, the Court found affirmative evidence of
congressional intent to permit private enforcement. The Court argued
that because Congress failed to vest exclusive authority to enforce the
USHA in HUD, it affirmatively contemplated the availability of private
enforcement mechanisms. The key, therefore, was that the congressional
failure to provide a comprehensive remedial scheme was accompanied by
positive evidence of Congress's and HUD's presumption that private
remedies would be available under the USHA.1 2 3 For the Court, these
117. Id. at 770-74.
118. Id. at 770, 774-75.
119. The Wright Court stated:
[Section] 1983 provides a remedial cause of action unless the state actor demonstrates by
express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended
to foreclose such private enforcement. "We do not lightly conclude that Congress intended
to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy" for the deprivation of a federally secured right.
Id. at 771 (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984)).
120. Id. at 771 ("We are unconvinced... that respondent has overcome its burden of showing
that 'the remedial devices provided in [the Housing Act] are sufficiently comprehensive ...
to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.'" (quoting Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981))).
121. Id. at 773.
122. Id. The Court referred to the local administrative grievance procedure mandated by a 1985
amendment to the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k) (Supp. III 1985), and implemented by a series of
HUD regulations, 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.50-966.59 (1987). See 107 S.Ct. at 773-74 & nn.8 & 11; see also
supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
123. The Court stated:
Not only are the Brooke Amendment and its legislative history devoid of any express indication that exclusive enforcement authority was vested in HUD, but there have also been
both congressionaland agency actions indicating that enforcement authorityis not centralized and thatprivate actions were anticipated. Neither, in our view, are the remedial mechanisms provided sufficiently comprehensive and effective to raise a clear inference that
Congress intended to foreclose a § 1983 cause of action for the enforcement of tenants'
rights secured by federal law.
107 S.Ct. at 771. The Court proceeded to cite a number of examples of "congressional and agency
actions" that appeared to show that Congress contemplated the availability of private enforcement

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1987:915

findings distinguished the USHA and the Brooke Amendment from the
statutes at issue in Middlesex and Smith. The findings also dispensed
with the preclusion problem and raised an inference of congressional intent to permit private enforcement of the USHA via section 1983

actions. 124
The Court then turned to an analysis of whether, under the Pennhurst test,12 5 the USHA creates substantive rights in tenants.12 6 The
Court perfunctorily dismissed the claim that the USHA and the Brooke
Amendment were too vague and indefinite to create enforceable rights.
"The Brooke Amendment could not be clearer . ... [It] was a

mandatory limitation focusing on the individual family and its income.
The intent to benefit tenants is undeniable.
"1 12 7 Because the USHA thus
created enforceable rights, and because there was no evidence of congressional intent to foreclose section 1983 enforcement actions, the Court
reversed the judgment below and held that tenants could bring section
1983 actions against local housing authorities.128

under the USHA. The Court noted, for example, that in raising the Brooke Amendment's rent
ceiling from 25 to 30%, Congress specifically exempted the five-year phase-in of rent increases by the
Secretary of HUD from judicial review. Id. at 771. The Court further noted that, "[a]pparently
dissatisfied with even a temporary preclusion of judicial review, Congress repealed it two years
later." Id. at 772.
The Court also noted that the grievance procedure mandated by the USHA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437d(k) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), was intentionally informal and noncomprehensive. "Congress'
aim was to provide a 'decentralized, informal, and relatively non-adversarial administrative process'
for resolving tenant-management disputes." 107 S. Ct. at 772 (quoting Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). The grievance procedure was not available to resolve
possible class actions. Id. Moreover,
HUD itself has never provided a procedure by which tenants could complain to it about
the alleged failures of [public housing authorities] to abide by their annual contributions
contracts, the Brooke Amendment or HUD regulations; nor has it taken unto itself the
task of reviewing [public housing authority] grievance procedure decisions.
Id. (emphasis added). Perhaps most importantly, the grievance procedure regulations themselves
appear to contemplate private judicial remedies,
provid[ing] that a decision terminating a grievance proceeding shall in no way effect [sic]
the rights of a tenant either to seek "trial de novo or judicial review in any judicial proceedings, which may thereafter be brought in the matter." HUD thus had no thought that its
own supervisory powers or the grievance system that it had established foreclosed resort to
the courts by tenants who claimed that a [public housing authority] PHA was not observing the commands of the Brooke Amendment.
Id. (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 966.57(c) (1986)). On the scope and adequacy of the USHA local grievance
procedure, see also supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
124. 107 S. Ct. at 772-74.
125. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
126. 107 S. Ct. at 774.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 775.
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Wright, Section 1983 Enforcement and Implied Private Rights of
Action.

As the preceding discussion illustrates, the prevailing standards for
implication of a private right of action 129 and section 1983 enforcement 130 under a federal statute are substantively distinct. Nevertheless,
the standards for section 1983 enforcement and the implication of private
rights of action are sufficiently similar to have produced substantial
scholarly criticism 3 1 and considerable confusion in the lower federal
courts--especially those that have dealt with questions of private enforcement under the USHA.1 32 Judge Gordon, concurring in the Fourth
Circuit opinion in Wright, noted that "the proper § 1983 analysis has
become mistakenly entangled with the analysis for an implied private
133
right of action."'
The confusion is understandable, given the convergence of several of
the applicable standards for respective analysis of section 1983 and implied right of action issues. For example, section 1983 problems require
examination of whether Congress expressly or impliedly foreclosed section 1983 actions;1 34 in a related fashion, an implied right of action problem requires the determination of whether Congress contemplated
private enforcement, as a general matter, of the statute at issue. Under
Middlesex, a section 1983 issue requires an examination of the "remedial
scheme" of the statute.1 35 Likewise, the parallel third prong of the Cort
test compels the court to examine the "statutory scheme" of the statute. 136 Under Pennhurst, section 1983 problems require analysis of
whether "enforceable rights" are created by the statute; 37 similarly, the
first prong of the Cort test focuses on the right- and benefit-conferring
elements of the statute under which a plaintiff claims an implied private
129. See supra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
131. See generally Brown, Whither Thiboutot: Section 1983, PrivateEnforcement, and the Damages Dilemma, 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 31 (1983); Sunstein, Section 1983 and the PrivateEnforcement
of FederalLaw, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1982); Wartelle & Louden, PrivateEnforcement of Federal
Statutes: The Role ofthe Section 1983 Remedy, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487 (1982); Note, Implied
Private Rights ofAction and Section 1983: CongressionalIntent Through a Glass Darkly, 23 B.C.L.
REV. 1439 (1982); Note, Preclusion ofSection 1983 Causes ofAction by Comprehensive Statutory
Remedial Schemes, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1183 (1982).
132. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
133. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 771 F.2d 833, 838 (4th Cir. 1985)
(Gordon, J., concurring), rev'd, 107 S.Ct. 766 (1987).
134. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13-21
(1981).
135. Id. at 14-15.
136. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
137. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1981).
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right of action.13 8
The distinctions in the analysis of section 1983 and implied right of
action problems lie largely in the varying strengths of relevant presumptions about congressional intent and the different levels of inquiry into
the indicia of that intent. In the absence of circumstances triggering
either the Middlesex or Pennhurst exceptions, section 1983 actions to
enforce federal statutes are presumptively permissible; 39 under Cort,
however, a court will imply a private right of action only when extensive
analysis of congressional intent and the statutory scheme reveals that
Congress expressly or impliedly contemplated private enforcement.14°
The Wright Court failed to clarify the confusion surrounding these
subtle distinctions.1 41 Nonetheless, the Court's analysis parallels that
which it might have undertaken in examining an USHA implied right of
action problem. The Wright Court spoke to the central issue under the
first prong of the Cort v. Ash test in conjuction with its Pennhurst analysis of whether the USHA creates enforceable rights in tenants.1 42 The
Court held that, under the USHA, "[tihe intent to benefit tenants is undeniable," and that "the benefits Congress intended to confer on tenants
are sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as enforceable rights."1 4 3
These findings clearly satisfy the threshold Cort test: the statute under
which an implied private right of action is claimed must confer enforcea138. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
139. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
141. The Court may have been influenced by the petitioners' particular emphasis on the divergence of section 1983 and implied right of action problems, and their accompanying insistence that
Wright presented a section 1983 issue alone. Brief for Petitioners at 27-34, Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 107 S. Ct. 766 (1987) (No. 85-5915).
Nonetheless, the Wright Court's exacerbation of the difficulties associated with the confluence
of the Cort and Thiboutot-Middlesex-Pennhursttests resulted in a flawed tendency on the part of the
lower courts to treat distinct elements of the Supreme Court's section 1983 and implied right of
action doctrines as substantively identical. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, for example, recently stated that the Pennhurst analysis of whether a particular
federal statute creates enforceable rights in fact "comprises the first of [the] four factors used to
determine whether to imply a cause of action from a federal statute." Edwards v. District of Columbia, 821 F.2d 651, 654 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
While the section 1983 private enforccment inquiry of whether a federal statute creates an "enforceable right" is closely related to the Cart test's initial inquiry of whether the plaintiffs are members of a protected class, the tests are substantively distinct. Indeed, it might be argued that the
latter test is easier to meet. A particular plaintiff might successfully show that a given federal statute
clearly is intended to benefit a certain class of citizens (of which he is a member), without necessarily
also showing that the statute is sufficiently specific so as to create an "enforceable right" in that class
within the meaning ofPennhurst. This distinction renders the Wright Court's failure to hold that an
implied private right of action exists 1o enforce provisions of the USHA even less understandable.
See infra notes 142-61 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
143. 107 S. Ct. at 774-75.
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ble rights on the prospective plaintiffs. Thus as an initial matter, the
Wright Court's analysis resembles the Cort test, despite the fact that the
implied right of action issue was not explicitly discussed.
Likewise, and more important, the Court's analysis under Middlesex of the section 1983 congressional intent issue appears to satisfy the
second and third prongs of the Cort test.' 44 The Court found not only
that Congress had not intended to preclude section 1983 actions to enforce the USHA, but also that the legislature affirmatively meant to permit "private enforcement." 1 4 5 The key for the present implied right of
action analysis lies in the Court's willingness to go beyond the level of
inquiry into legislative intent required under Middlesex and Smith. The
Middlesex-Smith presumption of no intent to preclude section 1983 actions would have been triggered by a simple finding that, in enacting the
USHA, Congress failed to address the section 1983 question.1 46 Yet the
Court went further, finding affirmative evidence that, as a general matter,
"private actions were anticipated" by Congress. 14 7
This additional, facially unnecessary analysis would satisfy the Cort
requirement that a court find positive evidence of explicit or implicit congressional contemplation of private enforcement before implying a private right of action. The Court's evidence is framed in terms that are
similar to those used in the application of Cort; the Court extensively
discussed indicia of legislative intent drawn from both the statute's legislative history and the statutory scheme of enforcement.14 8 By discussing
congressional intent as to private enforcement generally rather than as to
section 1983 enforcement alone, the Wright Court included its section
1983 analysis within a de facto, unstated implied right of action discussion. The Court went further than necessary, indirectly highlighting the
differences in the respective section 1983 and implied right of action standards. Rather than clarifying the issue, however, the Court inexplicably
left the USHA private enforcement issue unsettled and further
confused. 149
144. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
147. 107 S. Ct. at 771.
148. Id. at 771-75; see also supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
149. The Wright Court may have failed to reach the USHA implied right of action question,
notwithstanding the discussion of implied private actions in the lower court opinions, because its
holding on the section 1983 question made further analysis unnecessary. Indeed, the petitioners in
Wright argued for such an approach. See supra note 141. Perhaps more significantly, the Wright
majority may have found it far less insurmountable a task to justify private enforcement of the
Brooke Amendment via section 1983 actions than through implied private rights of action. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in an opinion issued less than
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Post-Wright Uncertainty About Private Enforcement.

The Wright Court left open two essential questions: first, which
provisions of the USHA other than the Brooke Amendment may be "privately enforced"; and second, which methods of private enforcementviz., implied private rights of action, section 1983 actions or third-party
beneficiary actions in contract-are available to plaintiffs seeking en-

forcement of USHA provisions. Since the Supreme Court decided
Wright, several lower federal courts have wrestled with both questions
with considerably less success than might have been expected had the

Wright decision more completely analyzed the salient USHA private enforcement issues.
In Edwards v. District of Columbia,150 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit engaged in the most exhaustive post-Wright discussion of the USHA private enforcement question.
Edwards considered a suit brought by residents of an USHA-assisted

housing project in the District of Columbia against the District (as the
tenants' landlord) and HUD, alleging that the District's failure to keep
the project in a decent, safe and sanitary condition resulted in its "constructive demolition," in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1437p. 15 1 Under
section 143 7p, HUD may not approve a local housing authority's application for the demolition of an USHA-assisted project unless the apply-

ing public housing authority has shown, inter alia, that the housing units
in question are unusable, that it is not reasonable to restore the units,
six months after Wright was decided, explicitly recognized the greater ease with which plaintiffs can
establish a section 1983 cause of action:
Whereas in implied cause of action cases plaintiffs must demonstrate both that the relevant
federal law secures rights and that Congress intended to create a cause of action to enforce
those rights, in § 1983 cases plaintiffs need only show that the statute in question indeed
secures the appropriate rights.
Edwards v. District of Columbia, 821 F.2d 651, 660 n.II (D.C. Cir. 1987). This note takes issue
with the Edwards court's assertion, implied in the quoted language, that the establishment of an
implied right of action requires affirmative evidence of congressional intent topermit private enforcement. See supra notes 28 & 31. The Edwards court clearly recognized, however, that section 1983
analysis does not require an exhaustive search for congressional contemplation of and assent to
private enforcement actions. Rather, Thiboutot,Pennhurst and Middlesex, read together, establish a
presumption in favor of the availability of section 1983 actions in the face of congressional silence on
the private enforcement question. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
The Wright Court may have understood the distinctions, recognized in Edwards, between section 1983 and implied private right of action questions. If so, however, it is even more difficult to
understand, given the breadth of its findings on the preclusion and enforceable rights questions, why
the Court failed to hold explicitly that an implied right of action exists for the enforcement of specific
USHA provisions. While the Wright Court clearly opened the door to such a holding in the future,
an entire class of plaintiffs-namely those seeking relief from defendants other than state actorshave been left unsure of the viability of private enforcement of the USHA.
150. 821 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
151. Id. at 653.
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that the demolition application has been developed in consultation with
the affected tenants, and that the public housing authority has assisted
1 52
tenants in securing comparable affordable housing.
The Edwards court held that a section 1983 action was not available
for the private enforcement of section 1437p. 153 The court began with a
statement of its reading of the relevant precedents:
We... read Pennhurst and Wright together as standing for the proposition that Congress must employ "sufficiently specific and definite"
statutory language in order to create rights and, at the same time, give
notice to the relevant governmental unit of its obligations in relation to
such rights. The issue to be decided in each case, of course, is whether
the statute is in fact "sufficiently specific and definite" so as to create
154
the rights alleged by the plaintiffs ....
On the dispositive question, the Court held that "neither the language nor the legislative history of § 1437p creates rights in public housing tenants against the constructive demolition of their units." 155
Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Wald argued that while section
1437p imposed an affirmative duty on HUD to approve or reject a demolition application in light of certain statutory criteria, it imposed no affirmative duty on local housing authorities to keep project buildings in
decent, safe and sanitary condition and thus created no rights on behalf
of the tenant-plaintiffs.
Section 1437p as written... does not establish independent duties on
the part of the PHAs [local housing authorities]; instead, it creates
conditions precedent that must occur before the Secretary approves a
demolition application (and, necessarily, before actual demolition). As
in contract law, these conditions
precedent do not, by themselves, con1 56
stitute independent duties.
At least one other federal court has rejected a claim for private enforcement of USHA provisions. In Price v. Pierce,157 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that prospective tenants of
USHA-assisted housing projects are not third-party beneficiaries of Annual Contributions Contracts between HUD and local housing authorities and thus cannot maintain claims for private enforcement of tenant
selection provisions in those contracts.
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437p (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 24 C.F.R. pt. 970 (1987) (implementing
regulations for section 14 37p).
153. 821 F.2d at 661.
154. Id. at 657-58.
155. Id. at 659-60.
156. Id. at 659.
157. 823 F.2d 1114, 1121-22 (7th Cir. 1987), petitionfor cert filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3438 (U.S. Jan.
5, 1988) (no. 87-967); see also Gholston v. Housing Auth., 818 F.2d 776, 780-81 (11th Cir. 1987)
(noting that while section 1983 action appeared to be available for enforcement of admissions provisions of USHA, question was not raised on appeal and was unnecessary to decision of case).
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The lower federal courts would not have to wrestle with the myriad
of USHA private enforcement questions if the Wright Court had simply
concluded, as its own analysis suggested, that an implied private right of
action exists to enforce provisions of a statute clearly designed to benefit
a discrete class of citizens. Instead, the Wright holding has forced
courts, like the panel in Edwards, to conduct a complex (and often highly
semantic) analysis of whether each individual USHA provision creates
an enforceable right such that a section 1983 claim is available. Plaintiffs
have likewise been forced to rely on alternative theories, including thirdparty beneficiary claims, in order to state a claim for relief-most notably
against HUD, which as a federal agency does not come within the state
action language of section 1983.158 In this sense, the post-Wright decisions are the most compelling illustration of the confused consequences
of the Supreme Court's failure explicitly to adopt the result most consistent with its own analysis.
E. The Consequences of Wright.
Although the Court repeatedly has voiced reluctance to decide more
than is necessary for the disposition of a given case, 159 the Wright Court's
analysis and findings could as easily have led it to find that an implied
right of action exists under the USHA. The Court's conclusions on the
questions of congressional intent, the USHA enforcement scheme, and
the rights-conferring character of the statute address and satisfy the Cort
implied right of action test. At bare minimum, the Court might have
waited for a case more akin to Howard v. Pierce,160 which squarely
presented the salient USHA private enforcement issues, and would have
presented an opportunity to clarify those issues in particular and, perhaps, the doctrine of implied rights of action in general.
Instead, the Court's decision in Wright leaves a number of answerable questions unanswered. By validating section 1983 actions alone, the
Court left hanging the class of plaintiffs who, like the plaintiffs in Howard, seek to proceed against HUD (rather than a local housing authority) 16 1 and who thus cannot take advantage of a section 1983 action. It is
still uncertain whether these plaintiffs can maintain a private right of
action under the USHA. More important, the Court clouded its own
section 1983 and implied right of action doctrines by creating the impression that the standards for private enforcement of a federal statute under
158.
159.
160.
161.

See, e.g., Price, 823 F.2d at 1121; Edwards, 821 F.2d at 661-62.
See supra note 141.
738 F.2d 722 (6th Cir. 1984); see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
Id.
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either approach are at best hopelessly entangled or at worst substantively
indistinguishable.
Wright is thus a decision that paradoxically goes too far in its analysis, but not far enough in its result. The far better approach would have
been for the Court, in Wright or some later case, to meet the broader
implied right of action question head on and obviate the need for section
1983 analysis. Because the fundamental issue is neither implied rights of
action nor section 1983 enforcement, but more generally private enforcement of the USHA, Wright iguores the significant legal questions in this
area and instead leaves an entire class of plaintiffs in limbo, further confusing an already complex field of federal courts practice. Indeed, the
only prudent way for the Court to resolve the real issue in a consistent
manner is to recognize the implied right of action under the USHA
which, as the Wright Court's own analysis makes clear, undeniably
exists.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite the Supreme Court's increasingly restrictive standards, a
private right of action should be implied under the United States Housing Act of 1937. Examination of the statute, its scheme of enforcement
and its legislative history reveals that the USHA meets the requirements
of the four-part test announced in Cort v. Ash, and that implication of a
private right of action under the statute would therefore further congressional intent and be "consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme" 162-namely, to remedy "the acute shortage of decent,
163
safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of lower income."
The Supreme Court, however, unnecessarily complicated the issue
of private enforcement of the USHA in Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority. By overextending its analysis of whether
plaintiffs may maintain section 1983 actions to redress alleged violations
of the USHA, the Court muddled both its implied private right of action
and section 1983 enforcement doctrines, while leaving the fundamental
USHA private enforcement question unanswered. Until the Court clarifies both the narrow USHA private enforcement issue and the broader
implied right of action and section 1983 doctrines, the lower federal
courts should still reach the conclusion that logically follows from the

162. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982).
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prevailing law: an implied right of action exists to allow private plaintiffs
to enforce provisions of the United States Housing Act.
Paul E. Harner

